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is given to the charge so often brought against the trusts that they stifle enterprise and bar the door of opportunity against the ingenious and energetic who are well fitted to succeed as independent producers. The author admits the qualified truth of this charge, and notes especially the growth and prevalence of nepotism in large corporations, but he offers as a compensation the elimination of the unfit from independent business activity. Many men enter business who are entirely unfitted for self-direction and society is at the expense of supporting these incapables often for considerable periods, weeding them out only by the drastic and purging processes of panic and liquidation. By placing the direction of industry in the hands of the more capable, business is made more stable and mistakes more uncommon. A suggestive passage attempts to show the growing dependence of every member of society, beginning with the highest, upon his fellow-men. Social complexity means increased responsibility, and the relation of subordination, now well nigh universal, does not preclude the exercise of the greatest initiative and skill. Professor Jenks might have gone further and shown how futile and barren of all social good are the methods by which most business success is achieved, and how great a blessing to society will prove a general organization of industry which will turn the world's brain power from finance, which means competition to industry, which means social welfare.

In the final chapter the discussion is summarized and a few tentative remedies are suggested, *i. e.*, increased power to be conferred upon the interstate commerce commission, amendment of the patent law to throw open the use of every patent on payment of a royalty to the inventor; reduction of duties, always, however, with the fear of international combination in mind, and above everything else, publicity for the consumer, the wage-earner, the possible competitor and the investor. These remedies are cautiously advanced, and the final word of the author to those who would reform the trusts is to make haste slowly, and to understand the question better before attempting to deal with it on a large scale. A valuable aid to a better understanding of the trust problem is this fair, deliberate, cautious and exhaustive discussion, which should serve as a model to all those who write on present day problems and who are so often misled by their faulty perspective.

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*Government or Human Evolution. Justice.* By EDMOND KELLY, M. A., F. G. S. Pp. xv, 360. Price, \$1.50. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1900.

This book follows the method of contrasts, a method which accords

well with its controversial character. Its object is practically controversial rather than theoretically polemic, the primary motive being to win men to action rather than to settle or unsettle articles of scientific faith. The animus of the book flows from differences among municipal reformers. A few years ago the city of New York found itself possessed of a City Club, supposedly containing the best and most public spirited men in the city, and various Good Government Clubs, affiliated with the City Club, but spread throughout the city and intended to comprise a more popular membership. To make a long story short, the movement implied in this organization as a whole failed of practical result because of the half-heartedness or absolute opposition to action manifested by the City Club. This body defended its attitude on the ground of a supposed doctrine of *laissez faire*. Mr. Kelly's book is devoted to a discussion of the attitude which should be assumed by such organizations and the philosophical reasons for such an attitude.

It is evident that the City Club cannot defend its passive attitude on the ground of *laissez faire*, for the simple reason that *laissez faire* is not a doctrine of passivity. That it is widely understood to be such by non-economic writers and speakers is an unfortunate fact and one that causes a deal of wasted rhetoric. The maxim arose from the practical observation that legislation only too frequently hinders individual enterprise; the doctrine simply formulates a prohibition upon interference with enterprise. How such a formula could be twisted into a defence of passivity is a problem for the psychology of the abnormal. The misinterpretation may partly be grounded in mistranslation, and the latter is probably the unconscious offspring of that incurable attitude of mind which sees a cure-all in legislation. The popular philosophy holds that nothing is being done if it is not done *en masse*, by edict and proclamation. The untrained mind is unable to watch the growth of a plant; it is affected only by cataclysms, earthquakes, meteors, and the like. To this primitive inability to differentiate is to be traced the popular philosophy of government as occupying the whole field of social action, and Mr. Kelly has unfortunately added his mite to augment this widespread socialistic error. The popular materialistic mind is awestruck by the very penumbra of a democratic statute or a royal proclamation, but is purblind to the effective social laws of the human mind.

Instead of criticising the erroneous nature of the interpretation of *laissez faire* made by the members of the City Club, Mr. Kelly falls in with that interpretation and denies the truth of the whole doctrine. He then attempts to find the philosophic ground for man's activity in general. In doing so he does not hold fast to his first interpretation

of *laissez faire*, but argues also in favor of specific legislative interference (pp. 272, 297, 337). He further states that human effort should pre-eminently follow legislative channels.

With this looseness of argument falls in naturally a corresponding looseness in the definition of government. Instead of regarding government in the usual way as an instrument of defined powers and duties, he assumes that it is the instrument of all positive social effort. Government is the maker of all artificial environment (p. 40). Government is social control consciously set up (p. 267). Progress is due to governmental action as shown by ancient history (pp. 208-9).

As remarked, the book proceeds on the method of contrasts. It is consequently open to all the objections which may be raised against that method. Conscious effort is defended or justified by showing that it is a characteristic of human evolution *as opposed* to organic evolution. But does conscious effort need justification, defence, or proof? The attempt is to prove that the members of the City Club should *act*, and the proof is that human societies advance by action and effort, *whereas* organisms advance by selfish and destructive evolution. But wherefore this "whereas?" Does it help the proof of human effort? This method of reasoning may be set down as antiquated. The method of contrasts too often falls into this rut of negative inference. The author's object would evidently have been much better attained by the adoption of the modern method of continuity. Had he only shown that effort is inherent in *all* progress and that the phenomenon of human consciousness appears through infinitesimal differentiation out of and away from the lowest organisms, his argument would have been more sound and conclusive. Effort would then be proved to be necessary to progress because it is universal in progress. This surely is a stronger argument than the attempt to prove its necessity by its limitation to the human stage of evolution. It may be noted that a fundamental phase of thought which has misled Mr. Kelly into the confusing method of contrasts is a predilection for a rather pronounced type of the doctrine of free-will. Not finding free-will in the less advanced forms of life, he assumes that it must exist in the more advanced, and hence falls into the method of contrasts, at divers points in his book making long lists of contrasted relations with reference to human and organic evolution (*cf.* p. 295).

While this book carries an air and animus of practical controversy, it follows in many respects the method of scientific exposition. A fundamental definition is given at the beginning which contains the terms most apt to further the arguments that follow. Evidently it is upon the interpretation of the term "natural" that these arguments are to depend. After a very interesting disquisition on the use of this term

in literature, our author comes to the conclusion that it best serves his purpose to exclude from the term whatever pertains to human effort. This use of the term is harmonious with the author's views as to free-will and as to the logic of contrasts, already noticed. If, on the other hand, he had chosen to proceed by what seems to be the preferable method of continuity, he would have allowed no exception to the logical extent of the term. It is possible that the author's use of the term comes closer to its popular use; but it must be remembered that the author's method of reasoning comes closer to the popular method. That alone is natural, according to Mr. Kelly, which characterizes those forms inferior to man. We shall see whither this definition leads.

Although Mr. Kelly declares his intention to stick to "facts" alone, he dwells constantly on the injustice of nature (pp. 288, 309); justice is defined as the effort to protect the individual from natural laws (p. 301); justice is the struggle of morality against sin, sin, of course, being characteristic of natural laws, and morality of non-natural human evolution (p. 323); we should study nature and then decline to follow her (p. 215) (although our author does, in places, admit that man must study natural laws in order to find which are inevitable and which can be successfully overcome) (pp. 305, 329, 332, 349); in fact, human evolution bears a remarkable resemblance to natural evolution (p. 170); when genius is not appreciated, it is the fault of nature (pp. 217-218); industry is natural and hence hostile to progress (p. 221); the evolution of the horse from its primitive ancestor resembles that of the locomotive from the wheelbarrow merely in so far as organic analogy is concerned (p. 241); the philosophy of effort begins to apply where organisms cease (p. 244); organisms are always opposed by wisdom (pp. 270-97).

Our author's method naturally leads to the conclusion that there is a natural and a non-natural environment. Just as human effort is non-natural, so is the "artificial" environment created by human effort also non-natural. The result of this handling of the subject must be that soon after we have passed the point in the scale of evolution (wherever it may be) where our author concludes to signalize the entrance of effort into the arena of progress, the environment becomes rapidly non-natural. The thinking and acting subject is himself, of course, non-natural, and the whole world that interests us is, therefore, non-natural. The higher we progress the further we separate ourselves from nature.

Mr. Kelly concludes that justice consists in the attempt to create the best artificial or non-natural environment (pp. 359-60). Such an environment is to be recognized from its conducing to man's happi-

ness (p. 333); and, again, happiness is to be induced by creating an environment favorable to morality (p. 335). But, after all, are these ideals so easily created? Is morality a cause of ideas without being an effect of circumstances? It seems as though Mr. Kelly should openly declare himself an intuitionist. Man and his environment are both of them arbitrary, non-natural, and, in fact, supernatural. The moral motive being the cause of everything, no cause is left for it. Lacking efficient cause, it also lacks final cause. There is no incentive to being moral if nothing is to be gained by morality outside of morality itself. A morality that is caused by nothing, that leads to nothing, and that is related to nothing not caused by itself, is a very uninteresting conception.

It would seem simpler and it would involve less circuitous reasoning, were we to make the assumption of continuous progress from a materialistic to a psychic state. At each stage of progress the past experiences would have tended to modify the environment and to form a part thereof. The future would be open to new adjustments stimulated by force (coming from the sun, if you please, and registered upon the sentient brain). Thus at every stage there would be a relatively psychic future, *i. e.*, open to modification by man, and there would be a relatively materialistic past. From the point of view of the individual, these stages might well be regarded according to Professor Simon N. Patten<sup>1</sup> as a series of partially fixed environments, each "wider" and better adapted to psychic life than its predecessor. This suggestion is offered in all humility and with some recognition of the difficulties of the problem involved and also of the obligations of the critic.

However, the method suggested offers no consolation to the members of the City Club. Whether they interpret *laissez faire* rightly or wrongly, progress does take place by effort. Mr. Kelly's book is thoroughly readable, and will be welcomed by those who desire to brush up biological analogies in connection with political and economic studies.

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*Studies in the Politics of Aristotle and the Republic of Plato.* By ISAAC ALTHAUS LOOS, Professor of Political Science. Bulletin of the University of Iowa: Studies in Sociology, Economics, Politics and History, Vol. I. Pp. 296. Price, \$1.00. The University Press, 1899.

In this volume Professor Loos has embodied a sort of abridgment

<sup>1</sup> "Theory of Social Forces."